Jason @0xbbbb_eth
Account Abstraction Developer
MEV Researcher
Core Contributor of Panta Rhei
Chain & Account Abstraction
MEV searchers have frontrun more than 850,00 ERC-4337 bundle transactions on Polygon.
In August, 16% of successful ERC-4337 bundles on Polygon were created by MEV bots.
These Bundlers profit by pocketing the difference between the fees paid by the UserOps in the bundle and the gas fee of the transaction.
Frontrunning doesn't affect the users' experience or negatively affect apps; they only see that their UserOp got executed. But it harms bundler operators who pay gas on failed transactions but don't earn the UserOp fees.
Bundlers need to use solutions that hide their transactions from these searchers. On Polygon,
@0xFastLane auctions can be used to send bundles directly to validator nodes, preventing frontrunning.
Preconf
Restaking reduces capital requirements to opt-in to mev-commit
Introducing mev-commit AVS on EigenLayer!
MEV Supply Chain
loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) for AMMs and for Dutch Auctions
different practical mitigation strategies
faster blocks
dynamic AMMs
ex post auctions
ex ante auctions
Protocol
FOCIL Resource Design Considerations
Open questions
Block Not Satisfying the Evaluation Function
Inclusion List Equivocations
Proposer Already Building on a Different Head
Inclusion List Transactions Invalidations
Proposer’s Observation of the IL Committee Subnet
introduces structure, adds deploy-time constraints, and updates some key instructions in favor of transaction execution optimization, compiler infrastructure improvements, and static analysis improvements.
improvements to deployment cost, runtime cost, and bytecode size
Layer2
Exploring Postconfirmations to Improve L2 UX
postconfirmation quickly provides some guarantees about the result of a transaction on an L2
How it works
What would ENS become if we reimagined it from the ground up today?
Feeling constrained by mainnet's limitations on user experience, extending ENS to a Layer
L2 requirements
EVM Compatibility
CCIP-read support
Open Source
Exit to L1
Sequencer Decentralisation
Finality
three main options
A Public ZK Chain
Our Own Instance of a ZK Chain
zkVM (Special Purpose Rollup)
Why not optimistic ?
a "challenge window" - typically 7 days
This rapid finality is crucial for ENS to prevent rolling back name ownership, a principle enshrined in the ENS DAO constitution
Introducing OP Succinct: Full Validity Proving on the OP Stack [OP Stack & zkVM SP1]
upgrade ANY existing OP Stack chain to use ZKPs in just 1 hour.
features
Fast finality secured by ZKPs–proving latency can be on the order of tens of minutes, a dramatic improvement over the 7-day fraud proof window of standard optimistic rollups.
Cost-effective proving, averaging as low as tenths of a cent per transaction.
Excellent developer experience for rollup teams with unlimited customization (in Rust) and easy maintainability.
with Gwyneth, your liquidity can remain on L1, while execution happens on L2
Case A: Alice keeps her liquidity on L1, but uses L2 to execute. She calls XCALLOPTIONS to run Uniswap logic on L2 block space against the L1 state root.
Case B: Bob keeps his liquidity on L2 and uses L2 to transact. He uses DELEGATE_CALL to run Uniswap logic on L2 against the L2 state root.
Others
Can OP_CAT make AMMs for Runes/BRC20?
Probably not.
Can we make a token protocol that is AMM-friendly with OP_CAT?
Yes! (with some interesting tradeoffs)
Can OP_CAT make RFQ
Yes!